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ii. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
HARRY JAMAR GORDANf Case No. 890130-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case in an interlocutory appeal from a district 
court order indicating that the district court had no 
jurisdiction to quash the bindover order issued by the circuit 
court. 
In support of the trial court's ruling, the State makes 
three primary claims: 1) a motion to quash a bindover order is 
an appeal in disguise; 2) the district courts have no appellate 
jurisdiction over bindover orders; and 3) the interlocutory 
appeal process is the most efficient route to resolving motions 
to quash. 
Appellant contests these assertions, as follows: 
I. 
BINDOVER QUASHAL IS NOT 
STRICTLY AN APPELLATE FUNCTION. 
It is apparently obvious to the State that a motion to 
quash a bindover is actually a masquerading appeal. Three 
times, without supporting authority, the State argues to that 
effect: 
This type of on-the-record review of the 
1 
sufficiency of the evidence with the 
requested relief being reversal of the order 
reviewed can be nothing other than appellate 
review. 
Respondent's brief at 3. 
As stated more fully above, what defendant 
sought from the distirict court was review of 
the circuit court record and a determination 
by the district court that the record was 
insufficient to support the order. This is 
nothing other than appellate review. 
Respondent's brief at 6. 
Original jurisdiction is the authority of a 
court to hear matters originally filed in 
that court. Appellate jurisdiction is the 
authority of a court to review orders of 
other tribunals. 
Respondent's brief at 6. 
Appellant first notes that appellate jurisdiction 
functions and original jurisdiction functions are not as clearly 
distinguishable as the State believes. Note that the 
jurisdiction of the district courts which the State characterizes 
as the district courts' "appellate jurisdiction" (Respondent's 
brief at 4), includes provisions for trials de novo in the 
district courts. See also Utah Code Ann. section 78-4-5 ("The 
circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo 
1 Utah Code Ann. section 78-3-4(5) provides district 
courts with jurisdiction over agency adjudicative proceedings: 
The district court has jurisdiction to review 
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in 
Chapter 46b# Title 63, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
Section 63-46b-15(1)(a) provides 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
2 
of the judgments of the justices1 courts and trials de novo of 
the small claims department of the circuit court."). 
Just as an appellate court may perform functions that 
might ostensibly be characterized as trial functions, so may a 
trial court perform during the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction functions which might ostensibly be characterized as 
appellate functions. E.g. State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 
(1983)(recognizing that a trial court might effectively reverse a 
co-equal court's ruling that was based on inadequate information). 
Appellant maintains that a motion to quash a bindover 
may be disposed of during the district court *s exercise of 
original jurisdiction. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) 
provides, in part, 
The following shall be raised at least five 
days prior to trial: 
(1) defenses and objections 
based on defects in the indictment 
or information other than that it 
fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, 
which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the 
proceedingC.] 
The State contends that this provision does not refer 
to motions to quash bindovers based upon an inadequate showing 
of probable cause, but pertains solely to typographical and other 
2 
technical errors in informations. However, Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 7 indicates that after a preliminary hearing, a 
magistrate either shall find that the probable cause showing is 
2 Respondent's brief at 7. 
3 
adequate and issue an order binding the defendant over to 
district court, or shall find that the probable cause showing is 
3 
inadequate and dismiss the information. Thus, a lack of 
probable cause to support the bindover order renders the 
4 
information subject to attack under Rule 12, supra. Cf. e.g. 
State v. Smith, 617 P.2d 232 (Okl.Cr. 1980)(affirming district 
court's "order quashing the information" based on insufficient 
evidence presented at preliminary hearing). 
Even if this were not the case, Rule 10 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplates that the district court 
dispose of all objections relating to the preliminary hearing 
3 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides in part, 
(8) (b) If from the evidence a magistrate 
finds probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate 
shall order, in writing, that the defendant 
be bound over to answer in the district 
court. The findings of probable cause may be 
based on hearsay in whole or in part. 
Objections to evidence on the ground that it 
was acquired by unlawful means are not 
properly raised at the preliminary 
examination. 
(c) If the magistrate does not find 
probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the 
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall 
dismiss the information and discharge the 
defendant. The magistrate may enter findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of 
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do 
not preclude the state from instituting a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
4 Note that Appellant's motion in the district court 
seeks not only quashal of the bindover, but also dismissal of the 
information (R. 58). 
4 
during the exercise of the court's original jurisdiction. That 
rule states, 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or 
upon receipt of the records from the 
magistrate following a bindover, the 
defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the 
district court. Arraignment shall be 
conducted in open court and shall consist of 
reading the indictment or information to the 
defendant or stating to him the substance of 
the charge and calling on him to plead 
thereto. He shall be given a copy of the 
indictment or information before he is called 
upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant 
requests additional time in which to plead or 
otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be 
granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or 
want or absence of any proceeding provided 
for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and 
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty 
is entered or the same is waived. 
Tdl If defendant has been released on 
bail, or on his own recognizance, prior to 
arraignment and thereafter fails to appear 
for arraignment or trial when required to do 
so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail 
may be forfeited. 
(emphasis added). 
Both Rule 10 and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure evidence legislative intent for district court 
disposition of objections to inadequate showings of probable 
cause at preliminary hearings during the course of the trial 
court's exercise of original jurisdiction. 
II. 
EVEN IF BINDOVER QUASHAL IS 
CONSIDERED STRICTLY AN APPELLATE FUNCTION, 
THE DISTRICT COURTS MAY PERFORM IT. 
In asserting that motions to quash bindovers are 
5 
subject to disposition solely in an appellate forum, the State 
cites State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 279 (Utah 1985), and 
notes that Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-26(2)(c) "governs 
appeals from bindover orders of circuit courts and grants a 
defendant the right to petition for an interlocutory appeal from 
the order." Respondent's brief at 4. 
A close reading of Schreuder reveals that the Court was 
not setting a mandatory appellate approach to motions to quash 
bindovers, but was simply noting that Mr. Schreuder could not 
raise an equal protection argument concerning the nature of 
review his motion to quash received, because he had received the 
benefit of review of his motion to quash in the supreme court. 
The court stated: 
The defendant raises an equal protection 
argument related to the fact that his 
preliminary examination was conducted in 
district court rather than in circuit court, 
claiming that he has been denied the right to 
review of the bindover order by a superior 
court, a right which is afforded to all adult 
defendants whose preliminary hearings are 
conducted in circuit rather than in district 
court. We treat this argument summarily. 
Section 77-35-26(b)(3) provides that an 
appeal may be taken by the defendant "[f]rom 
an interlocutory order when, upon petition 
for review, the supreme court decides that 
such an appeal would be in the interest of 
justice...." That statute governs all 
appeals from bindover orders entered in any 
court. The defendant had the same right to 
seek review as does any other criminal 
defendant, and no equal protection problem 
arises. 
6 
5 
Id. at 270. 
Assuming arguendo, but certainly not granting on the 
merits, that bindover quashal is strictly an appellate function, 
the district courts may perform it. 
As noted repeatedly, this Court is vested with 
appellate jurisdiction over the circuit courts. Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(d); 78-4-11. How then, can it be that the 
district court in this case might have exercised "appellate" 
jurisdiction over the bindover order? 
As explained in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1977), in conducting a preliminary hearing, the circuit court is 
not acting as a circuit court, but is acting as a magistrate. 
In the Van Dam case, the court was discussing the impropriety of 
a city court dismissal of a class A Misdemeanor case under the 
statutory scheme operant at that time. The court explained, 
A preliminary examination does not 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In 
such a proceeding, the action is not action 
by a judge of any court, but that of a 
magistrate, a distinct statutory office. 
Justices of the Supreme Court, district 
judges, city court judges, and justices of 
the peace, when sitting as magistrates having 
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law 
upon magistrates and not those that pertain 
to their respective judicial offices. 
Id. at 1327. 
5 Appellant abandons the argument at pages 5 and 6 of 
Appellant's opening brief concerning the precedential value of 
the Brickey decision. As noted by the State at page 5, in 
writing this argument, Appellate counsel, Elizabeth Holbrook, 
failed to recognize the statute defining the appellate 
jurisdiction of the district courts operant at the time the 
Brickey decision was written. Appellate counsel regrets the error. 
7 
Regardless of which judge or justice sits as magistrate 
over a preliminary hearing, it appears that the district court is 
expected by the legislature to review the conduct and/or findings 
of the magistrate when faced with an objection. If this Court 
wishes to characterize this review as "appellate", then Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 and 12 provide the statutory 
authorization of district court exercise of this "appellate" 
. . . . . 6 jurisdiction. 
III. 
MOTIONS TO QUASH SHOULD BE 
DISPOSED OF IN DISTRICT COURT. 
The State contends that the remedy that Appellant was 
limited to in this case was an interlocutory appeal to this 
Court. There are two reasons why this Court should not 
interpret this Court's interlocutory appeal provision as the sole 
remedy for objections to preliminary hearings: first, in so 
doing, this Court might strip itself of the discretionary powers 
of its interlocutory appeal process in these cases, and/or 
second, in so doing, this Court might force district courts to 
proceed through moot trials. 
Before this Court accepts the State's invitation to 
characterize a motion to quash a bindover as strictly an appeal, 
this Court should note that Article VIII section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution provides in part, 
6 Article VIII section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
indicates that the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts 
is "as provided by statute". 
7 Respondent's brief at 3. 
8 
Except for matters filed originally with the 
supreme court, there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
By statute, however, interlocutory appeals to this 
Court are discretionary, not mandatory. Utah Court of Appeals 
Rule 5; Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(c). 
If this Court were to find that district courts have no 
jurisdiction over motions to quash bindovers, this Court might, 
either by denying a petition for interlocutory appeal, or by 
affirming the bindover order on an interlocutory appeal, force a 
trial court through a moot trial. While Appellant certainly 
recognizes the dispatch and facility with which this Court 
reviews records of cases in lower courts, Appellant submits that 
a trial court presiding over a trial might gain, prior to or 
during trial, insight unavailable to one facing a cold 
transcript. If this Court lacked the opportunity to gain this 
insight during an interlocutory appeal, or declined to grant a 
petition for interlocutory appeal, a trial court might thus be 
forced through a moot trial. 
Common sense and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 
and 12 counsel against such a waste of resources, and support 
this Court's determination that district courts have jurisdiction 
to quash defective bindover orders. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests this Court to order the district 
court to evaluate Appellant's motion to quash the bindover order 
9 
on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this (g± day of yMJULL 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Counsel for Appellant 
/ / 
1990. 
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